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Money Talks, Constituents Walk:

Pennsylvania's Corporate Constituency
Statute Can Maximize Shareholders' Wealth
ROBERT GOODYEAR MURRAYt
"It will be a lot more expensive than $44.50 a share before this
company goes down. That I can assure you."'
-Robert

Ripp, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of AMP.
INTRODUCTION

In 1983, reacting to the enormous rise in hostile takeovers,2 the Pennsylvania legislature became the first state
to enact a constituency statute.3 Adopted with "an antitakeover motive, ' Pennsylvania's constituency statute
authorized the board of directors and individual directors
and officers to consider the effects that corporate decision

making would have on employees, suppliers, and customers
of the corporation, communities in which offices or other es-

tablishments of the corporation are located, and all other
pertinent factors, when deciding whether a contemplated

t B.A., St. Lawrence University, 1989; M.S., State University of New York at
Syracuse, College of Environmental Science and Forestry, 1992; J.D., State
University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2000.
1. Gordon Fairclough, Two Egos Clash in Massive Struggle as AlliedSignal
Bids to Acquire AMP, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1998, at A3 (quoting Robert Ripp).
2. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:Interpreting CorporateConstituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 25 (1992); see also Sara S. Nickerson,
The Sale of Conrail:Pennsylvania'sAnti-Takeover Statutes Versus Shareholder
Interests, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1998).
3. See Orts, supra note 2, at 25. Constituency statutes are called different
names by different commentators including nonstockholder constituency statutes, nonshareholder constituency statutes, expanded constituency statutes,
nonmonetary factor statutes, directors' duty statutes, fiduciary duty statutes,
corporate constituency statutes, and multi-constituency statutes. See id. at 16.
4. Id. at 26.
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action is in the best interests of the corporation.' In 1990,
the Pennsylvania legislature amended the constituency
statute6 and authorized additional factors which directors
could consider in making corporate decisions such as the
short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including "the continued independence of the corporation,"'
and "[the resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and
potential) of any person seeking to acquire control of the
corporation."' In combination with other anti-takeover provisions already enacted under the Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law (PBCL),9 the revisions to the constituency
statute0 established Pennsylvania
as the "strictest anti1
takeover regime in the country."
5. See Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No., 1983-92, §1(B), 1983 Pa. Laws 395.
6. See discussion infra Part II for a complete description of 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN §§1712, 1715, 1716, and 1717, generally referred to as the "corporate
constituency statutes." See generally Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of CorporateConstituency Statutes and Formulation of DirectorDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991) (determining that "nonshareholder constituency" statutes or "stakeholder" statutes are accurately referred to as "corporate
constituency statutes"). Id.
7. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN §1715(a)(2) (West 1995).
8. Id. §1715(a)(3).
9. While the PBCL contains several anti-takeover provisions, those that
played a critical role in AMP's defense against AlliedSignal's hostile takeover
attempt include: 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (West 1995) (providing that,
among things, corporations that choose to be bound by section 2501, by not
opting out of its coverage, are subject to anti-takeover provisions as per section
2511 et. seq., section 2521 et. seq., section 2535 et. seq., and section 2541 et. seq.),
section 2513 (granting to the board of directors the power to adopt shareholder
rights plans (poison pills)), section 1525(a) (stating that a corporation may create and issue securities having conversion or option rights (poison pills)), and
section 2535 (stating that shareholders of a registered corporation are not entitled to propose amendments to the corporation's articles of incorporation). The
1988 Committee Comment to section 2513 states that sections 2513 and 1525
are "intended to validate expressly as a matter of state corporation law the
adoption of shareholder rights plans or 'poison pills.'" Committee Comment, 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2535 (West 1995); see also Nickerson, supra note 2, at
1385-88 (discussing various other anti-takeover provisions of the PBCL). See
generally ROBERT D. ROSENBLUM & L. STEVENSON PARKER, THE PENNSYLVANIA
TAKEOVER ACT OF 1990: SUMmARY AND ANALYSIS (1990) (discussing Pennsylvania's "business combination statute with fair price provisions" and "cash-out
statute" as well as the 1990 disgorgement statute and the control share acquisition statute).
10. Reference to Pennsylvania's constituency statute refers to title 15, section 1715 of Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law. See Orts, supra note 2,
at 28.
11. Id. Pennsylvania's constituency statue is the most prohibitive statute of
hostile takeovers of its kind. See Nickerson, supra note 2, at 1374 (citing Orts,
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The purpose of Pennsylvania's constituency statute is to12
protect in-state corporations from a hostile takeover,
thereby keeping jobs in the state. 3 Some commentators
have argued that constituency statutes "decenter" share-

holders by allowing management to "choose courses of action that are inconsistent with traditional notions of shareholder primacy." 4
Another commentator states that
constituency statutes enable management to disregard the
best interests of the shareholders in order to further the interests of other stakeholders.' 5 One commentator notes that
constituency statues can render shareholders defenseless
against their managements "by allowing directors to justify
any rejection of a hostile takeover as against the existing

supra note 2, at 28).
12. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-Senate, Dec. 6,
1983, at 1431 (statement of Senator Fumo) ("I am not naive... I also know this
bill will probably have a chilling effect on adverse corporate takeovers."); see
also Nickerson, supra note 2, at 1418. See generally Orts, supra note 2, at 24
(stating that state legislatures passed anti-takeover statutes in response to
their constituents who "perceived hostile takeovers negatively," and who believed that takeovers "caused or... facilitated an attendant loss ofjobs").
13. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-Senate, Dec. 6,
1983, at 1431 (statement of Senator Fumo) ("[T]his bill would prevent foreign
interests from coming in and taking over Pennsylvania corporations and obliterating those corporations, putting them out of business, milking their assets,
milking their cash and, in the end, increasing unemployment because of the
people who they would lay off after the mergers were consummated.").
14. David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 248
(1991).
15. See Lynda Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate
Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 J. CoRP. L. 1, 9-10 (1998).
Constituency statutes may also enable management to disregard the best interests of the shareholders in order to further management's own interests. See id.
Critics of Pennsylvania's 1990 amendments to its constituency statute, including institutional investors and lobbyists for takeover specialists, contended that
the amendments were "grossly weighted in favor of management .... [and that
they] eliminate[d] the primary fiduciary responsibility of a board to its shareholders, in effect making directors accountable only to themselves." Milo Geyelin & Vindu P. Goel, Pennsylvania Legislators Gird to Battle Over Bill that
Could Become Stiffest Anti-Takeover Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1989, at A16.
Former Chancellor, Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware William Allen
stated that constituency statutes lead to management entrenchment, such that
directors would be motivated by a desire to retain control rather than by rational business decision making. Interview with William Allen, Professor of
Law, New York University School of Law, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Apr. 19, 1999). In
this manner, constituency statutes could be implemented for purposes other
than for considerations of non-shareholder interests.
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interests of the stakeholders." 6 Another widely cited commentator believes, to the extent that management obtains
enhanced discretion in defending the corporation from a
takeover attempt, the primary managerial goal of maximizing shareholder wealth can be compromised. 7 Nonetheless, studies testing the effects of anti-takeover legislation on stock prices are conflicting, as some studies found
statistically negative and significant effects on share prices
while others found negative but statistically insignificant
effects on stock prices, and still other studies reported insignificant effects on control premiums in contrast to studies that found increased average control premiums. 8 Interestingly, an analysis of Pennsylvania's 1983 anti-takeover
statute revealed no discernable impact on share prices."
The failed AlliedSignal, Inc. ° hostile takeover attempt
of AMP, Inc. (AMP)2' and the subsequent Tyco International
Ltd. (Tyco)" purchase of AMP suggest that shareholder interests can be protected, and shareholder wealth can be
16. Gary M. Holihan, Pennsylvania'sAnti-takeover Statute: An Impermissible Regulation of the Interstate Market for Corporate Control, 66 CHL-KENT L.
REV. 863, 871 (1990).
17. See Roberta Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA.
L. REv. 111, 113 (1987) (stating that anti-takeover statutes are "troublesome,
for they can produce results that are inconsistent with the core goal of corporation law-the maximization of equity share prices").
18. See P.R. Chandy et al, The Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Pennsylvania Fourth GenerationAntitakeover Law, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 399, 401 & n.14
(1995); see also John C. Coffee Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An
Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 437
n.7 (1988) (presenting a review of some of the conflicting conclusions of studies
measuring the effect of the passage of stakeholder, or constituency statute legislation).
19. See Romano, supra note 17, at 180-87.
20. Prior to November 1999, AlliedSignal, Inc., was a Delaware company,
and was an advanced technology and manufacturing company serving customers worldwide with aerospace and automotive products, chemicals, fibers, plastics, and advanced materials. In November 1999, AlliedSignal merged with
Honeywell, Inc., and changed its name to Honeywell International, Inc. See
S&P 500 to Add Molei, Old Kent, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1999, at C16.
21. AMP, a Pennsylvania corporation prior to Tyco's purchase of AMP, designs, manufactures, and markets a broad range of electronic, electrical, and
electro-optic connection devices and an expanding number of interconnection
systems and connector-intensive assemblies.
22. Tyco International Ltd. corporate offices are located in Bermuda. Tyco is
a diversified manufacturing and service company that designs, manufactures,
and distributes electrical and electronic components, undersea cable communication systems, disposable medical supplies, fire detection and suppression systems, and security systems.
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maximized, even while the Pennsylvania constituency statute is fully implemented. AMP successfully utilized the
Pennsylvania constituency statute in rejecting AlliedSignal's unsolicited tender offer by claiming that the offer
was not in the best interest of the company, its shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and other relevant
constituencies.i Under the cover of the constituency statute, AMP was able to foster local support and public empathy in the face of AlliedSignal's hostile takeover attempt
and find white knight24 Tyco. The result: Tyco paid a
greater control premium than AlliedSignal offered and
AMP shareholder wealth was maximized.
This note analyzes AlliedSignal's failed takeover attempt of AMP and how Pennsylvania's constituency statue
can be strategically deployed by target management, ultimately buying time to find a higher premium tender price
that maximizes shareholder wealth. The purpose of this
note is to show how AMP shareholders benefited from
Pennsylvania's constituency statute by obtaining a greater
premium for their shares than they may have been able to
receive if the constituency statute was not implemented by
AMP management.26 Part I explains the evolution of corporate constituency statutes. Part II analyzes Pennsylvania's
23. See Jerry L. Gleason, AMP Workers Praise Rejection of Offer: Takeover
Effort Creates Anxiety as Employees Evaluate Their Individual Situations,
HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Aug. 22, 1998, at A3.
24. A "vhite knight" is an entity that is sought out by a target company confronting a hostile bid to acquire the company in place of the hostile bidder. See
WILLLAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BusINEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE
181 (6th ed. 1996). Although the target would prefer to avoid any acquisition,
the white knight is a more appealing acquirer, often working in cooperation
with current management. See id.
25. This theory relies on the efficient market hypothesis, which holds that
the market price of a firm's stock reflects all currently available information
about the firm. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). This theory then holds that
"[a]s an antitakeover law or other constraint is likely to result in increased
premium payments to shareholders in the event of a successful takeover bid,
stock prices should rise upon enactment of such a law, in order to reflect this
benefit." Chandy, supra note 18, at 420 n.121 (citing Harry DeAngelo & Edward
M. Rice, Antitakover CharterAmendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN.
ECON. 329, 335-44 (1983)).
26. The purpose of this note is not to analyze the effect that passage of
Pennsylvania's constituency statutes have had or continue to have on share
prices of firms incorporated in Pennsylvania. For this type of analysis, see generally Chandy, supranote 18.
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corporate constituency statutes. Part III demonstrates how
AMP utilized the Pennsylvania constituency statute to defend itself from AlliedSignal and how AMP directors ultimately maximized shareholder wealth by increasing the
price of acquiring control.
Some commentators argue that Pennsylvania's constituency statute goes too far,27 others argue that they do
not go far enough, and yet others question if defining constituencies even matters." During Pennsylvania's legislative hearings on the 1983 constituency statutes," some
Senators argued that the Pennsylvania constituency statutes would protect Pennsylvania corporations, jobs, and the
Pennsylvania economy,31 while another expressed a concern
over whether management or stockholders would benefit
from passage of constituency statutes. 2
27. See Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Other
Constituencies Statutes: Potential For Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2253
(1990) (stating that constituency statutes "pose potential for mischief' and "opportunities for misunderstanding," and "may radically alter some of the basic
premises upon which corporation law has been constructed in this country
without sufficient attention having been given to all of the economic, social, and
legal ramifications of such a change in the law"); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell,
A Theoretical and PracticalFramework for Enforcing Corporate Statutes, 70
TEx. L. REv. 579, 589 (1992) (stating that constituency statutes "threaten to
revolutionize [corporate law] by changing the established principle that directors' fiduciary duties are owed primarily to (or at least for the benefit of) stockholders").
28. See Wai Shun Wilson Lung, The Inadequacy of ShareholderPrimacy:A
Proposed CorporateRegime Recognizes Non-shareholderInterests, 30 COLuM. J.
L. & Soc. PROB. 587, 617 (1997) (stating that because the constituency statutes
are not enforceable, there is no mechanism by which failure to consider
stakeholder interests can be remedied); see also David N. Hecht, The Little
Train That Couldn't:Did the PennsylvaniaAnti-Takeover Statute Failto Protect
ConrailFrom a Hostile Suitor? 66 FORDHAm L. REV. 931, 969 (noting that "[i]t is
difficult to imagine how the other constituencies provision could be enforced").
29. See William J. Carney, Does Defining ConstituenciesMatter? 59 U. CIN.
L. REV. 385 (1990).
30. See supratext accompanying note 6.
31. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal, Dec. 6, 1983,
at 1432.
This bill is not a cure-all, but this bill will give those people who want
to try and help the economy of Pennsylvania another tool in their arsenal to help us out. [A]lthough this bill appears to be big business legislation, and it may very well be, our constituents work in the factories
owned by the big business. We are crazy if we want to drive those businesses out of our state along with those jobs.
Id. (quoting Senator Fumo).
32. See id.
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This note concludes that after receipt of an unsolicited
hostile tender offer, Pennsylvania's constituency statue can
be nominally deployed in the name of protecting nonshareholder constituents while simultaneously and effectively deployed in the pursuit of maximizing shareholder
wealth.
I.

DEFENDING AGAINST THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER ATTEMPT:
ANTI-TAKEOVER LEGISLATION IN AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

With Congressional passage of the Securities Act of
193333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 the federal
government took an active role in regulating corporate
ownership and affairs.35 Cash tender offers,36 which do not
involve issuing securities or soliciting proxies,37 fell into a
regulatory gap between the requirements of the Securities
Act and the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act."
A tender offer in the corporate takeover context may be
friendly or hostile. "In a friendly merger, the bidding company's management will negotiate the terms of the merger
with management of the target company, subject to the approval of both boards of directors and, in certain circumstances, shareholders.,93 A "hostile bid is one that is opThe difficulty comes ... when we have a hard time discerning in a bill
of this kind whether it is for the benefit of stockholders or whether it is
for the benefit of preserving management because the basic function of
management is to operate a company in such a fashion that it would
produce a profit for the stockholders.
Id. (quoting Senator Zemprelli).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
34. See id. § 78.
35. See Hecht, supranote 28, at 934.
36. A tender offer is the bidder's offer to buy a controlling block of shares at
above-market prices for cash, securities, or both. See Neil C. Rifkind, Should
Uninformed ShareholdersBe a Threat Justifying Defensive Action by Target Directors in Delaware?: "JustSay No" After Moore v. Wallace, 78 B.U.L. REV. 105,
108 (1998). Tender offers are usually highly publicized offers to all shareholders
to sell their shares. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW & POLICY

1065 (2d ed. 1988).
37. A proxy contest occurs when a group of shareholders, other than management, attempt to replace management-dominated directors by nominating
new directors, and thus seeks shareholder support to elect such nominees to the
target board, since such nominees are committed to selling the target company.
See Edward D. Rogers, Striking the Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes and
Corporate Governance, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 777, 784 (1994).
38. See Chandy, supra note 18, at 404.
39. Rifkind, supranote 36.
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posed by incumbent management and the board of directors" 40 and one in which the bidder appeals directly to

shareholders. 4' A hostile bidder can use a tender offer or a
proxy contest, or both, in seeking control of a target corporation. By the 1960's, as a result of the tender offer gap in
the federal regulatory scheme, the tender offer "emerged as
the method of choice for raiders to obtain control of publicly
held corporations."42
Responding to the inability to satisfactorily protect investors confronted with a cash tender offer, Congress
passed the Williams Act of 1968."8 The Williams Act required a bidder who was attempting to acquire beneficial
ownership of more than five percent of the shares of a class
of securities" to file with both the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the target company, its identity, source of
funds and plans for the company. 45 Although the Williams
Act placed burdens on bidders, "the protection was less
than [what] management sought and tender offer activity
continued to escalate. ' G
Reacting to what many state legislatures felt as a Congressional failure "to provide adequate refuge from hostile
bidders,"41 states began to pass anti-takeover legislation

making tender offers more difficult.48 The first generation
of state anti-takeover legislation often provided a state administrator with the power to determine the adequacy of
disclosures and the ability to impose a waiting period between the tender offer filing date and the date on which it
was to become effective.49 When these types of statues were
declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court, 50 states passed second generation anti-takeover leg40.

KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 24.
41. See Rifkind, supranote 36.
42. Chandy, supranote 18, at 404.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1992).
44. See id. §78m(d)
45. See id. §7Sm(d)(1).
46. Hecht, supranote 28, at 935.
47. Id.
48. See Chandy, supranote 18, at 405.
49. See Hecht, supra note 28, at 936.
50. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (holding that the
provisions of the Illinois Act requiring registration of any tender offer for the
shares of a target corporation was in conflict with the Commerce Clause as an
excessive burden on interstate commerce in relation to the local interest served
by the statute).
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islation including control share acquisition statutes, 51 fair
price statutes, 2 right of redemption statutes,5 and business
combination statutes.54 When the United States Supreme
Court upheld Indiana's control share statute,55 "many states
created a third generation of anti-takeover statutes that
were more aggressive than their predecessors." 5 These
statutes include poison pills,57 the scorched earth defense,
the "Pac-Man" defense, the white knight defense, the crown
jewel defense, and the greenmail defense.55
The 1990 fourth-generation Pennsylvania statute is regarded as the most aggressive takeover statute to date.59
Four new provisions were enacted. The disgorgement provi-

51. "Control share acquisition statutes require [that] acquisition of stock

that constitute[s] control, or the voting rights of such shares, to be approved by
a majority of disinterested shareholders." Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in CorporateLaw, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 709, 725 (1987).
52. "Fair price statutes require that the same price be paid to all shareholders who tender their shares, regardless of whether they participate in the first
or second tier or a multi-tiered offer." Hecht, supra note 28, at 939-40.
53. Redemption rights statutes give cash redemption rights to all shareholders "against any acquirer of at least thirty percent of the firm's stock." Romano, supranote 51, at 725.
54. "Business combination statutes prevent a target's management from engaging in any business combination for a designated period of time after a
shareholder acquires a certain amount of the target's outstanding shares."
Hecht, supra note 28, at 939.
55. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
56. Hecht, supranote 28, at 937.
57. Poison pills massively dilute the shares of a target corporation and make
acquisition unacceptably costly by distributing to target stockholders a right
which acquires significant economic value upon the occurrence of specified
events involving a non-board approved acquisition of a significant ownership
positioii in the company. See 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN,
TAKEOVER DEFENSE 5-6 to 5-7 (5th ed. 1995).
58. The scorched earth defense is accomplished when the target company
liquidates its assets; the "Pac Man" defense is where the target company makes
its own tender offer for the bidder's stock; the white-knight defense is when a
friendly corporation is sold a large portion of the company's shares; the crown
jewel defense involves selling the most attractive asset of the target corporation
to a friendly party; and the greenmail defense is one where the target selftenders for only the shares held by the hostile bidder. See Gregg M. Fishbein,
Three Generationsof State Anti-takeover Statutes: Their Legitimacy in Relation
to Their Effects on Interstate Commerce and the Supremacy Clause, 38 DRAKE L.
REV. 437 (1988-89) (citing Kirk R. Crowder, Note, Recent Developments in the
Use of the Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense: Limiting the Business Judgment
Rule, 31 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1083, 1083 n.2, 1083-84 n.4 (1987)).
59. See ROBERT D. ROSENBAUM & L. STEVENSON PARKER, THE PENNSYLVANIA
TAKEOVER ACT OF 1990: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS v (1990).
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sion ° discourages takeover attempts by allowing covered
Pennsylvania corporations to sue persons and seek disgorgement, to the corporation, of any profits realized from the
sale of securities held by short-term shareholders who dispose of their shares within eighteen months after attempting to acquire control of the corporation. The control share
acquisition statute withholds voting power from acquirers
who obtain specified percentages of the outstanding shares
until shareholder approval is obtained from a majority of
preexisting, disinterested shareholders.6 ' The "Severance
Compensation for Employees Terminated following Certain
Control Share Acquisitions and Labor Contracts" statute
provides for severance payments to employees terminated
in connection with a hostile takeover.62 It is the fourth provision, which redefined the fiduciary duties of directors in
regard to corporate constituents,6 " which was relevant in
the AlliedSignal's attempted hostile takeover of AMP.
II. PENNSYLVANIA'S CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
In order to appreciate how constituency statutes affect
the fiduciary duty of directors and officers, it is "necessary
to consider the business judgment rule' in light of the new
60. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§2571-76 (West 1992).
61. See id. §§ 2561-67.
62. See id. §§ 2581-83.
63. See infra Part II A-B.
64. See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1048 (Pa. 1997). In Cuker,
Chief Justice Flaherty noted that Pennsylvania courts had never previously
used the term "business judgment rule" in a corporate context, nor had the
courts explicitly adopted the business judgment rule, but concluded that "a review of Pennsylvania decisions establishes that the business judgment doctrine
or rule is the law of Pennsylvania." Id. at 1047. The Cuker court held that
Pennsylvania adopted the business judgment rule as follows:
[W]hile directors are personally responsible to the stockholders for any
losses resulting from fraud, embezzlement or wilful misconduct or
breach of trust for their own benefit and not for the benefit of stockholders... , yet they are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even
though they may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous,
provided they are honest and provided they are fairly within the scope
of the powers and discretion confided to the managing body.
Id. (quoting Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872)). The Cuker court, in defining
the business judgment rule, also cited to Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 224
A.2d 634, 644 (Pa. 1996), which stated:
[T]he directors of a business corporation are not insurers that their actions will result in pecuniary profit and they are, in the courts of their
duties, called upon to undertake certain calculated business risks; ...
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65

[constituency] statutes."

A. The Business Judgment Rule and Expanded Director
Duties
Traditionally, shareholders have enjoyed the right to

enforce the duty of care, 66 subject to application of the busi-

ness judgment rule, "which insulates managerial decisionmaking from shareholder (and judicial) scrutiny."" The
business judgment rule also governs the propriety of a
board's action in response to a tender offer or merger pro-

posal. 68 Therefore, a board is not under any obligation to ac-

cept a tender offer or merger proposal simply because the
price offered is at a premium above market price. 69 Yet, in

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,"° the Delaware Su-

preme Court "significantly eroded the protection of the
business judgment rule in takeover cases by establishing an
enhanced standard for review that has intimately involved
for errors in judgment, exercised in good faith, the directors of a corporation should not be penalized.
Selheimer, 224 A.2d at 644, quoted in Cuker, 692 A.2d at 1047. Professor David
Millon discusses the business judgment rule as follows:
Courts will not allow shareholders to challenge exercises of managerial
business judgment if, at the time of the decision, three prerequisites
were satisfied. The decision in question must have been the product of
(i) disinterested and (ii) informed judgment, and (iii) an objectively rational effort to further the corporation's best interests.
Millon, supra note 14, at 250.
65. Id. at 249.
66. Pennsylvania's duty of care is as follows: "[A] director of a business corporation... shall perform his duties as a director.., in good faith, in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with
such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances..." 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §1712(a) (West 1995). Officers are expected to perform their duties in the
same manner as directors. Id. at §1712(c); see also Cuker, 692 A.2d at 1048
(stating that "[tihe business judgment rule should insulate officers and directors from judicial intervention in the absence of fraud or self-dealing, if challenged decisions were within the scope of the directors' authority, if they exercised reasonable diligence, and if they honestly and rationally believed their
decisions were in the best interest of the company").
67. Millon, supra note 14, at 249.
68. See generally Michael J. Kennedy, The Business Judgment Syllogism:
Premises Governing Board Activity, 1044 PRAC. L. INST. 135, 137 Apr-June
1998. (discussing the business judgment rule as a syllogism in response to particular situations).
69. See id.
70. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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the courts in reviewing the reasonableness of directors' behavior."7' In Unocal, the court questioned whether the business judgment rule should be applied at all in a situation
involving a hostile takeover and held that "[blecause of the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily
in its own interests ... there is an enhanced duty which
calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protection of the business judgment rule may be conferred."72
In contrast to the Delaware Unocal decision, many
other states have passed constituency statutes. 3 Constituency statutes have been adopted in at least twenty-nine
states, 74 and while there is some variation in content from
state to state, they generally purport to allow directors of
public corporations to consider interests beyond shareholders when making decisions concerning the corporation's
business. 5 Most commentators agree that constituency
statutes have been adopted "in the context of concern over
the possibility of hostile tender offers directed against local
enterprises."
The American Bar Association noted that
proponents of constituency statutes:

71. Kennedy, supra note 24, at 156.; see also Nickerson, supra note 2, at
1383 (stating that the Unocal decision "determined that the business judgment
rule should not be uniformly applied to all board actions").
72. 493 A.2d at 946; see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del. 1994) (stating that unlike the business
judgment rule, where the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, the Unocal decision
shifted the burden of proof to the directors requiring them to prove that they
were adequately informed and acted reasonably).
73. See Orts, supra note 2, at 44 (stating that constituency statutes "legally
validate the practice of stakeholder management, which departs from models
that manage solely for shareholder value"); see also Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholder: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under the
Takings Clause, 24 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1998) (noting that while Delaware has not
enacted a constituency statute, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 (Del. 1989), held that "the interests of non-shareholder constituencies can be considered, at least in the narrow context of takeovers, provided such consideration bears some reasonable
relationship to general shareholder interest). See generally Nickerson, supra
note 2, at 1373 (stating that "Delaware is among the minority of states which
has not adopted a constituency statute").
74. See Nickerson, supra note 2, at 1373.
75. See Orts, supranote 2, at 26-27.
76. Id. at 74; see also Romano, supra note 17, at 137 (stating that "the concern of a local firm that it might be acquired was often the impetus for the legislation").
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correctly recognize that many groups in addition to shareholders
have a continuing and important economic stake in the welfare of
corporations with which they have relationships. Often the shareholder's interest in the corporation is transitory, frequently a matter of days or weeks, while that of a manager or other employee
may embrace a career and that of a community far longer. Similarly, a supplier may be almost wholly dependent upon one corporate customer for its economic viability, and a corporate customer
may also have a measure of dependence upon its supplier. A community and its desirability as a corporate home and a residence for
its citizens may depend upon one or a handful of corporations. A
friendly or unfriendly change of control of a corporation
can create
• "
77
severe hardships for many of these constituencies.

In effect, constituency statutes, in regard to hostile
takeover attempts, have broadened the business judgment
rule giving the board authority to consider a broad range of
non-shareholder constituencies in determining what action
is in the best interest of the corporation. 8 Stated differ77. American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate Laws, Other ConstituenciesStatutes: PotentialFor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2235, 2268 (1990).
78. See, e.g., Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Proxy Regulation &
Take-Overs, in SECURITIES LAw SERIES: SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAw §13.35(7) (1997). The state of Ohio has adopted a very broad constituency
statute, such that the Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. section 1701.831 (Anderson 1992)
requires directors to consider the interests of a corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers, the economy of the state and nation, community
and societal considerations, and the long-term and short-term interests of the
corporation, including "the possibility that these interests may be best served
by the continued independence of the corporation." Id. The Indiana Business
Corporation Law, section 23-1-35-1(d)-(g) requires that the directors take into
account the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation weighing the
effect of a business combination on constituencies including shareholders, employees, suppliers, and corporate customers, and the communities in which corporate facilities are located. The Florida General Corporation Act, section
607.058, the Hawaii Business Corporation Act, section 415-35(b)(4), and the
Oregon Business Corporation Act, section 60.357(5), all require the board to
consider the effect of a business combination on the economy of the state and
the nation. The New York Business Corporation Law, section 912, allows directors to consider the short-term and long-term interests of the corporation and
its shareholders, the short-term and long-term effects for prospects for potential
growth, productivity, and profitability of the corporation, employees, retired
employees receiving corporate benefits, the interests of suppliers, distributors,
customers, and creditors, and the production of goods, services, and employment opportunities and other community interests. See also Orts, supra note 2,
at 29 (stating that "the general aim of all constituency statutes plainly is to expand the permissible range of considerations for directors, and often officers as
well, with respect to their fiduciary duty of care when making business decisions").
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ently, these statutes alter the grounds available to shareholders for overcoming the business judgment rule's presumption in favor of management by allowing management
to protect nonshareholder interests without fearing liability
to shareholders for their decisions. 9
Constituency statutes were derived from stakeholder
management theory ° and corporate social responsibility
theories that espoused the value of considering corporate
stakeholders other than shareholders, including employees,
customers, suppliers, creditors, and the community in
which the corporation does its business, in corporate management decisions."' These statutes have rekindled an old
debate82 "over whether the law should limit corporate goals
to profit maximization for shareholders or expand corporate
goals to include consideration of affected groups, such as
employees, customers, suppliers, and communities."" In
general, it is disputed as to whether these statutes promote
corporate "social responsibility" or merely enable corporate
managers to entrench themselves.84
79. See Millon, supranote 14, at 253-54. While the duties of care and loyalty
would be much the same under the traditional business judgment rule doctrine,
"[a] management decision to sacrifice shareholder interests in order to benefit
nonshareholders no longer amounts to a per se violation (such as waste of corporate assets)." Id. at 254.
80. See Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigmthat
Fits "JustRight," 23 J. CORP. L. 245, 249-50 (1998) (stating that stakeholder
theory argues that the corporation ought to be managed for the benefit of all affected by corporate actions, not simply the shareholders).
81. See Orts, supra note 2, at 21-22.
82. The role of the corporation in modem society was debated by Professors
E. Merrick Dodd and Adolf A. Berle in the Harvard Law Review in the 1930s.
Compare E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45
HARv.L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (stating that the corporation was "an economic
institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function," and
that managerial duties extend to a broader group than the shareholders), with
A.A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931), and
A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365 (1932) (contending that managerial duty runs primarily to the
shareholders). But see A.A. Berle Jr., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPATILIST
REVOLUTION 169 (1956) (stating that the debate "has been settled (at least for
the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's contention").
83. Edward D. Rogers, Striking the Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes
and CorporateGovernance, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 777, 779 (1994).
84. Wallman, supra note 6, at 163 (arguing in favor of constituency statutes); Orts, supra note 2 (discussing the various positions); see also supra text
accompanying note 15. See generally James J. Hanks Jr., Playing with Fire:
Nonshareholder Constituency Statues in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97
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B. Pennsylvania'sCorporateConstituency Statutes
Under Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law
(PBCL), a director is required to act in the "best interests of
the corporation." 5 Section 1715 of the PBCL broadly defines
what directors may take into account in consideration of the
"corporation's best interest" thereby encapsulating "constituency considerations." Specifically, section 1715(a)
states:
(a) General Rule. In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors,... may, inconsidering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by
such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in
which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its longterm plans and the possibility that these interests may be best
served by the continued independence of the corporation.
(3) The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential)
of any person seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
(4) All other pertinent factors.8

6

Thus, section 1715 establishes that non-shareholder
stakeholder interests may be considered. Section 1715(b)

(1991) (arguing against constituency statutes).
85. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§1712, 1715, 1716, 1717 (West 1995).
86. Id. § 1715(a)(1-4).
87. Section 1711(b) permits a company to opt out of section 1715 by amending its bylaws to explicitly provide that section 1715 shall not be applicable. See
id. § 1711(b)(1-3). If a corporation opts out of section 1715, section 1716 applies.
See id. § 1711(a). Section 1716 provides that a board of directors may consider
the same factors as specified in Section 1715 in evaluating the effects of its actions. See id. § 1716(a).
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further provides that "[t]he board of directors.., shall not
be required, in considering the best interests of the corporation or the effects of any action, to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any particular group affected by
such action as dominant or controlling interest or factor."8
It is this section of the Pennsylvania constituency statute
that is particularly expansive because "directors are not required to consider the interests of [any] one group... [such
as shareholders] as dominant with respect to the interests
of other corporate constituencies."89 The effect of section
1715(b) is a specific grant of discretion to directors to determine which constituency group's interests to elevate
above others, ranking shareholders as only one of the interests and not giving them a priority interest." With this
statute, "the Pennsylvania legislature explicitly rejected a
line of Delaware case law91. .. which requires that directors
act in the best interests of short-term shareholders in a
change of control context."92
Section 1715(d)" of the PBCL retains the ordinary
business rule with respect to director adoption of defensive
measures in response to a hostile acquisition, thereby
making a presumption "that any act by the board is made
88. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(b) (West 1995).
89. See MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, 1 TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS S 5.03[1], 5-33 to 5-34. (1997); see also Nickerson, supra note 2, at
1378 (stating that the "constituency statute merely ranks shareholders as one
of the interests which may be considered, but does not give them priority").
90. See Nickerson, supranote 2, at 1378.
91. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986) (enjoining asset lock-up agreement entered into by directors); Grand
Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering the
board to redeem shareholder rights plan and to stop a spin-off of assets and to
permit a premium cash tender offer to proceed); City Capital Assocs. L.P. v. Interco Inc, 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering the board to redeem shareholder rights plan); see also Nickerson, supra note 2, at 1380 (stating that the
"draftsmen of Pennsylvania's constituency statute were clearly familiar with
the prevailing Delaware law and determined that it inadequately protected corporations").
92. Nickerson, supranote 2, at 1379 & n.58.
93. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1715(d) (West 1995). This section provides:
In assessing whether the standard set forth in section 1712 [the standard of care owed by a director] has been satisfied, there shall not be
any greater obligation to justify, or higher burden of proof with respect
to, any act as the board of directors.., relating to or affecting an acquisition or potential or proposed acquisition of control of the corporation than is applied to any other act as a board of directors ....
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in the best interests of the corporation, unless a plaintiff
can rebut the presumption by showing a breach of fiduciary
duty, lack of good faith, or self-dealing."' If an action is ever
subject to judicial review, section 1715(c)95 essentially provides "that there can be no breach of a director's fiduciary
duty for his acting or failing to act with respect to several
different types of defenses, thus many of a board's actions
in response to a hostile takeover are entirely beyond the
of judicial review. " "
scope
Section 1717 provides a limitation on standing:
[T]he duty of the board of directors... is solely to the business
corporation and may be enforced directly by the corporation or
may be enforced by a shareholder, as such, by an action in the
right of the corporation, and may not be enforced directly by a
shareholder or by any other person or group. Notwithstanding the
preceding sentence, sections 1715(a) and (b) (relating to exercise of
powers generally) and 1716(a) (relating to alternative standard) do
not impose upon the board of directors... any legal or equitable
duties, obligations or liabilities or create any right or cause of action agaipst, or basis for standing to sue, the board of direc-

tors ....

Thus, none of the stakeholders, for example, employees,
suppliers, customers, creditors, or the community "in which
the corporation is located whose interests may be considered by the board have standing to sue" the board to enforce
their interests."
In considering the language of Pennsylvania's corporate
constituency statute, it is important to observe that sections

94. Nickerson, supranote 2, at 1384.
95. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1715(c). This section provides:
In exercising the powers vested in the corporation,... the fiduciary
duty of directors shall not be deemed to require them: (1) to redeem
any rights under, or to modify or render inapplicable, any shareholder
rights plan,... (2) to render inapplicable... any other provision of this
title relating to or affecting acquisitions or potential or proposed acquisitions of control; or (3) to act as the board of directors,... solely because of the effect such action might have on an acquisition or potential
or proposed acquisition of control of the corporation or the consideration that might be offered or paid to shareholders in such an acquisition.
Id.
96. Nickerson, supranote 2, at 1385.
97. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717.
98. Nickerson, supranote 2, at 1380.
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1712, 1715, 1716, and 1717 consistently refer to acting in
the best interests of the corporation, making it clear that
"[t]he overriding mandate is that the directors' duty is owed
solely to the corporation, not to the shareholders or any
other group."99 Steven M.H. Waliman, the co-drafter of the
first corporate constituency statute enacted in Pennsylvania in 1983 and the drafter of the 1990 Pennsylvania corporate law amendments reaffirming the corporate constituency concept, defines the "best interest of the corporation"
as follows:
[I]n the case of ordinary business matters, the corporation's interest is in enhancing its ability to produce wealth indefinitely. The
wealth concept includes both profit from today's activities and expected profit from tomorrow's activities. Basically, the term embraces the corporation's own interest in the success of its longterm corporate goals, culture, and business. The interests of the
corporation also include the interwoven interests of its various
constituencies, such as shareholders, employees, customers, the local community, and others. Linking these interests to the corporation's interests resolves much of the tension that would otherwise
exist from competing and conflicting constituent demands.'00

In the takeover context, Wallman states that the director's duty is "to determine whether the corporation's interests are advanced or harmed by the proposed transaction"
and "if the best interests of the corporation are not advanced by the takeover, the board, as a matter of fiduciary
duty, need not accept the bid, regardless of the premium offered shareholders."' It is important to note that the statute is permissive, meaning that "directors are permitted to
consider non-shareholder interests, but are not required to
do so."'°'
99. Wallman,supranote 6, at 165.
100. Id. at 170.
101. Id. at 185. Wallman provides an example to explain this concept. If a
corporation receives a highly leveraged bid for all the outstanding shares of a
corporation at $50 per share, that may place the corporation in danger of bankruptcy and closure, and an alternative equity financed bid at $45 per share, under the corporate constituency standard, the board could accept the lower bid "if
the board believed that the lower bid's benefits to the corporation and its other
constituencies outweighed the benefit of the extra money for shareholders." Id.
102. Nickerson, supra note 2, at 1374. The statute provides that actions
"against the board to enforce its duty can only be brought by the corporation or
the shareholders derivatively." Id.; see also Holihan, supra note 16, at 883
(stating that the fiduciary duty provisions "erased any doubt that directors of
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Judicial interpretation of Pennsylvania's constituency
statute has been sparse. °3 Most recently, in Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail,Inc., the court held, citing to sections
1712 and 1715 of the PBCL, that directors owe their fiduciary obligation to the best interests of the corporation and
can consider "all groups that may be affected by their actions."0 4 In Norfolk Southern, Conrail and CSX entered into
a merger agreement whereby CSX would acquire Conrail's
stock for cash and through an exchange of CSX shares for a
total value of $8.1 billion.' 5 Nine days later, Norfolk announced a $9.1 billion all cash tender offer of Conrail's stock
in an attempt to block the merger 6 and simultaneously
17
filed suit challenging the Conrail-CSX merger agreement.'
Norfolk argued that Conrail's attempt to merge with CSX
and disregard Norfolk was "without regard for the best interests of its shareholders or other constituencies."'
Conrail insisted "that the CSX deal was more advantageous to shareholders, even though it was for considerably
less money, emphasizing the benefits of the CSX tax free
stock exchange and that the CSX equity interest could
prove more valuable than the cash being offered" over the
long term.0 9 Conrail's management further justified its action by claiming that it was protecting the corporation's
long-term interests and the corporation's stakeholders."0 In
its ruling, the Norfolk Southern court upheld Pennsylvania's constituency statute and supported the notion that a
board of directors has "wide discretion in how to react to soPennsylvania corporations may consider stakeholder interests as predominant
over those of the shareholder").
103. See, e.g., Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp 238,
265 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (noting that Pennsylvania law "permits directors to consider factors other than price" in evaluating a takeover bid); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that Pennsylvania law requires a director to oppose a tender offer that is harmful to the
corporation's long-term interests, even at the expense of short-term shareholder

interests).
104. See Transcript, Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail Inc., Nos. 96-7167,
96-7350, Nov. 19, 1996, at 647 [hereinafter Nov. 19, 1996, Transcript].
105. See Nickerson, supra note 2, at 1388-89.
106. See id. at 1395.
107. See id. at 1396.
108. Hecht, supranote 28, at 962-63.
109. Nickerson, supranote 2, at 1397-98.
110. See Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy:
a Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-shareholder Interest, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 616 (1997).
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called takeover bids" even when such discretion fails to
maximize shareholder wealth."'
III. THE AMP DEAL:

CONSTITUENCY STATUTES CAN
MAXIMIZE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

On August 4, 1998, AlliedSignal announced plans to acquire AMP Incorporated in a hostile takeover bid for $44.50
per share, or $9.8 billion in cash, immediately "sending
AMP's share price soaring 49%.""' The offer represented a

55% premium over AMP's previous days' closing price. On
November 14, 1998, Tyco entered into a definitive agreement to buy AMP for $11.3 billion, valued at $51 per
share."' Below is a presentation of the events which transpired in the time between AlliedSignal's offer and Tyco's
purchase.
A. AlliedSignal's UnsolicitedBid
In the four months preceding AlliedSignal's unsolicited
bid, AMP responded to flattening sales by closing two
plants in Pennsylvania and North Carolina, 4 enforcing
mandatory employee furloughs, and eliminating overtime
and certain administrative expenditures."' In July of 1998,
after announcing a 48.9% net income decline, AMP revealed
plans to accelerate sales, cut costs, eliminate 3500 employ-

111. Approximately two months after the court's decision, Conrail accepted
a cash-and-stock merger with CSX worth about $102 per Conrail share, rather
than an all cash $115 per share offer from Norfolk Southern, justifying that the
decision was in the "best interests of Conrail and its constituencies, including
shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, and communities served." Lynda
J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency
Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 IowA J. CoRP. L. 1, 23 (1998).
112. Gordon Fairclough, AlliedSignal Offers $9.8 Billion for AMP, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 5, 1998, at A3.
113. See Mark Maremont & Gordon Fairclough, Accord with AMP Caps
Months of DealMaking by Tyco, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at B4.

114. See AMP Targets Costs After Sales Flatten, AMP Media Inc., (Electronic Bulletin News) Dec. 21, 1998, http://www.ebnews.com/section/
042798/news3.html (on file with the author and the Buffalo Law Review).
115. See AMP Asks U.S. Employees to Skip Work for a Week, (Electronic
Bulletin
News)
Dec.
21,
1998, http'//www.ebnews.com/daily.0698/
062698news9.html (on file with the author and the Buffalo Law Review). The
furlough affected approximately 22,000 employees. See id.; see also Fairclough,
supranote 112.
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ees and close an additional factory in Pennsylvania."' Unfortunately, these efforts to cut costs 1 7 that followed three
years of corporate restructuring proved ineffective and left
AMP prime for the picking by AlliedSignal."'
In July, 1998, AlliedSignal wrote to AMP's chief executive and offered to buy the company for $43.50 a share, and
offered to consider a higher price if AlliedSignal shares
could be used as some or all of the compensation." When
AMP failed to respond, AlliedSignal submitted their unsolicited bid and notified AMP that a tender offer would begin
by August 10, 1998, unless AMP management agreed to begin negotiations. 2 ° When AMP refused to meet with AlliedSignal, AlliedSignal "officially launch[ed] its $9.99 billion
tender" offer for all of the approximately 220 million outstanding AMP shares. 2 '
B. The Best Defense is a Great Offense
AlliedSignal recognized that AMP was protected by
Pennsylvania's tough anti-takeover laws and a "poison
pill"122 that gave only incumbent directors the power to en-

116. See AMP Posts 48.9% Drop in Profits, (Electronic Bulletin News) December 21, 1998, http'J/www.ebnews.com/daily.0798/072498newsl.html (on file
with the author and the Buffalo Law Review); see also Gordon Fairclough &
Steven Lipin, AlliedSignal's Bid for AMP Isn't a Surprise to Everyone, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 6, 1998, at B4.
117. See Are AMP's Cuts Too Little, Too Late? (Electronic Bulletin News)
Dec. 21, 1998, http://www.ebnews.com/daily/0798/071798news6.html (on file
with the author and the Buffalo Law Review).
118. See Joyce Hanson, AMP Is Ripe, CENT. PENN. Bus. J., Aug. 14, 1998. At
this point in time, AlliedSignal was aggressively attempting to diversify their
automotive parts interests into advanced technologies. See id. AlliedSignal's
unsolicited bid came at a time when AMP was underperforming in an expanding industry, its profits were declining, and its share price was trading near its
52-week low, falling some 45% in the 12 months before AlliedSignal's bid. See
Fairclough, supranote 1.
119. See Fairclough, supranote 112.
120. See id.
121. Gordon Fairclough, AlliedSignal Starts Its Hostile Offer to Take Over
AMP, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1998, at A8; see also Joyce Hanson, supra note 118.
122. AMP's poison pill or shareholder rights become exercisable when a
shareholder acquires 20% or more of its common stock. These rights can only
be redeemed by continuing directors. See Dennis J. Block & Alan J. Rice, Recent Developments in Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Initiatives,
and the Markets for Corporate Control, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 164 (Practicing Law Institute, 1998).
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gage in a merger.'23 Shortly after filing its tender offer,
AlliedSignal commenced a "consent solicitation"'24 to solicit
consent from AMP shareholders to elect 17 new directors,
thereby increasing the size of AMP's board to 28 and giving
AlliedSignal supporters control over AMP's board.' The
new directors could then redeem the poison pill prior to
AlliedSignal closing its tender offer.26 Simultaneously,
AlliedSignal also filed suit in federal court to have the poison pill declared illegal.'
On August 21, AMP formally rejected AlliedSignal's
takeover offer,'12calling the bid a low-ball offer and not in
the best interest of the company, shareholders, employees
and customers.'29 In announcing that its board of directors
had voted to recommend that shareholders reject AlliedSignal's unsolicited tender offer, CEO Ripp stated that
AMP "absolutely believe[s] that we have far greater value
123. See Fairclough, supranote 121.
124. See Schedule 14D9 filed by AMP, Inc. on Aug. 21, 1998.
125. See Gordon Fairclough, AMP ChiefResists AlliedSignal Bid for Discussions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1998, at A9; see also Fairclough, supranote 121, at
A8 ("[Aiccording to AMP's bylaws, shareholders can vote to enlarge the size of
the board.").
126. See Block & Rice, supranote 122, at 164.
127. Id. AlliedSignal filed suit to challenge the "dead-hand" provision of the
poison pill, which enables only current board members at the time of an offer to
approve or disapprove of the offer. See Legal Maneuvers Complicate Battle Between AlliedSignal and AMP (Electronic Bulletin News) Dec. 21, 1998,
http://vww.ebnews.com/daily/0898/082808newsll.html (on file with the author
and the Buffalo Law Review).
128. See Schedule 14D9 filed by AMP Inc. on Aug. 21, 1998. In responding
to AlliedSignal's offer, AMP stated the following:
The AMP Board of Directors has determined, by the unanimous vote of
those present, that the AlliedSignal offer is inadequate, does not reflect
the value or prospects of AMP and is not in the best interests of AMP
and its relevant constituencies, including its shareholders,... [and]
[tihe board by such unanimous vote recommends that AMP's shareholders reject the AlliedSignal offer and not tender their shares pursuant to the AlliedSignal offer.
Id.
129. See Gordon Fairclough, AMP Appoints Ripp as Chairman, CEO, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 24, 1998, at A3; see also AMP Rejects AlliedSignal's Offer and
Names New Top Exec, Dec. 21, 1998, http://www.eetimes.com/news/
98/1022news/amp.html (on file with the author and the Buffalo Law Review).
AMP also restated its "turnaround plan" announced in June that involves
trimming 3500 employees by year's end through retirements, attrition, and layoffs. See id. Simultaneously, AMP "overhauled its top management," appointing
Robert Ripp as chairman and chief executive. Joseph Kahn, AMP Rejects
AlliedSignal's Takeover Bid of $10 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at D1.
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than the offer they put on the table" and vowed to shed divisions, close plants, and lay off workers to make itself more
profitable. 3 '
At this same time, AMP also strengthened its poison
pill 3 ' in an attempt to make removal of the pill impossible
"if control of AMP's board changed hands."' The effect of
the amendment is that once an unsolicited acquisition offer
is made and there is a change in the composition of AMP's
board of directors "such that the pre-offer directors (other
than those affiliated with the acquirer) and their approved
successors no longer control the board, the poison pill can
no longer be redeemed by any directors (regardless of when
or how elected) and will be outstanding until the poison pill
expires 1 by its terms (in the case of AMP, November 6,
1999)." 3

On August 24, AMP filed suit in federal court seeking to
block AlliedSignal's attempt to gain control of its board of
directors. AMP alleged that AlliedSignal failed to disclose,
in its Schedule 14D-1 Securities and Exchange Commission
filings that, if it were to succeed in placing its representatives on the AMP board, those representatives would have a
conflict of interest, since those individuals may act to benefit AlliedSignal and not necessarily consider what is in the
130. See Kahn, supra note 129 (quoting Robert Ripp). Of course, the irony of
Ripp's divisions shedding, plant closing and employee cutting plan is that these
actions are, arguably, not in the best interest of AMP's employees and community either.
131. The poison pill was amended to provide the following:
The Rights may be redeemed until ten business days following the day
on which any person becomes an Acquiring Person, provided, however,
that the Rights shall become nonredeemable if there is a change in the
Board of Directors occurring at any time following receipt of an unsolicited acquisition proposal such that the disinterested directors (as
such term is defined under Pennsylvania law) in office prior to the first
such unsolicited acquisition proposal, together with their successors as
may be approved by the Board of Directors prior to their election, no
longer constitute a majority of the Board of Directors.
Schedule 14D9 filed by AMP Inc, supranote 122.
132. Fairclough, supra note 129.
133. See Block & Rice, supra note 122, at 149; see also Legal Maneuvers
Complicate Battle Between AlliedSignal and AMP (Electronic Bulletin News)
Dec. 21, 1998, http://www.ebnews.com/daily/0898/082808newsll.html (on file
with the author and the Buffalo Law Review) (quoting Robert Ripp and stating
that the amended poison pill will better protect the interests of the company's
shareholders, providing them with greater value than AlliedSignal's bargainbasement offer).
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best interest of AMP's shareholders. On August 25, 1998,
AlliedSignal filed its second suit against AMP challenging
the legality of AMP amendments to its poison pill. 3 '
C. ShareholdersSupport AlliedSignal'sHostile Takeover
Approximately 72% of AMP shareholders agreed to sell
their shares to AlliedSignal for $44.50 per share.'36 Gaining
confidence and applying more pressure to AMP, AlliedSignal announced that it would amend its tender offer to
immediately buy 18%... of AMP's outstanding shares and
would solicit a second consent from AMP shareholders to
approve a measure that would make the poison pill "invalid
in the case of any offer where the bidder gains control of at
least 50% of the company through a tender offer."'38 The effect of this second consent solicitation would be to allow
AMP shareholders to amend AMP by-laws and to then remove the authority over the poison pill from the AMP board
of directors and to place poison pill authority in the hands
of a designated three-person committee. 9
Defending itself from AlliedSignal's decision to purchase 18% of AMP outstanding shares, AMP's board
amended its poison pill enabling the pill to take effect upon
the purchase of 10%, rather than 20%, of outstanding
shares. 14 Calling the AMP's measures desperate, Allied-

Signal reduced its proposed purchase to 9% of AMP's shares
to avoid triggering the pill. 41 AMP's defensive tactics an134. AMP Moves Takeover Battle From Boardroom to Courtroom (Electronic
Bulletin
News)
Dec.
21,
1998, http'J/vww.ebnews.com/daily/0898/
082498news4.html (on file with the author and the Buffalo Law Review).
135. See Legal Maneuvers Complicate Battle Between AlliedSignal and
AMP, Electronic Bulletin News, Dec. 21, 1998, http://www.ebnews.com/
daily/0898/082898newsll.html (on file with the author and the Buffalo Law
Review).
136. Gordon Fairclough, AlliedSignal's AMP Bid Gains Support, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 15, 1998, at A3. AMP's shares rose approximately 7.9% as investors
gained confidence from support for the hostile takeover. See id.
137. Purchasing 18% of the stock would fall below the 20% mark that would
trigger AMP's poison pill. See Sharon R. King, AlliedSignal Takeover Bid for
AMP GainingSupport, N.Y. TIMMs, Sept. 15, 1998, at C22.
138. See id.
139. See AMP Inc. v. AlliedSignal Inc., No. CIV.A.98-4405, CIV.A.98-4058,
CIV.A.98-4109, 1998 WL 778348, at *3. (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998).
140. See Gordon Fairclough, AMP Toughens Defense Against AlliedSignal
Bid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998, at A8.
141. See id.
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gered some AMP shareholders
who 142
expressed disappointto negotiate.
refusal
AMP's
with
ment
D. The "Save AMP Law"
Even while utilizing provisions under Pennsylvania's
constituency statues and poison pill provisions, AMP sought
further anti-takeover protection. AMP lawyers drafted a bill
for the Pennsylvania Legislature which would prevent AMP
shareholders from giving control of the company to AlliedSignal through a consent solicitation."T The proposal
stipulated that, during a period of eighteen months following a hostile takeover bid, shareholders could only vote on a
merger at a meeting and not through the mail by written
consent.'45 If the bill were to pass, AMP shareholders would
have to wait for AMP's annual meeting, traditionally held
in April. 46 The timing of the bill was crucial, because it
could only protect AMP if it was passed prior to October 15,
when shareholders would be entitled to vote on AlliedSignal's plan to expand AMP's board and invalidate the poison pill.
In support of the legislation, Robert Ripp emphasized
that the value of keeping AMP headquartered in Pennsylvania "is not only important to our shareholders, but it's
very important to all the communities, all of our employees
and all of our suppliers." 47

142. See Some AMP Investors Angry: Some Shareholders Want to Negotiate
with AlliedSignal Over Hostile Takeover Attempt, YORK DAILY REC., Sept. 22,
1998, at B5.
143. See id.
144. See Gordon Fairclough, AMP Seeks PennsylvaniaLegislation to Block
AlliedSignal's Takeover Bid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1998, at B2. Consent solicitation remained in AMP's charter when it left New Jersey and reincorporated in
Pennsylvania in 1989 and investors say AMP received shareholder approval to
reincorporate in Pennsylvania by leaving this measure in place. See Steven
Lipin & Gordon Fairclough, AMP's Antitakeover Tactics Rile Holder, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 5, 1998, at A3.
145. See Fairclough, supra note 144, at B2.
146. See id.
147. AMP Employees Rally for Pennsylvania's Support, Electronic Bulletin
News, Dec. 21, 1998, http://www.amp.com/news/1998/nr_092898b.html (on file
with the author and the Buffalo Law Review).

654

BUFFALOLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

E. AMP's Self-Tender
On September 29, 1998, AMP attempted to win back its
shareholders who were supporting AlliedSignal by offering
to pay $55 a share for as much as 14% of its stock." Some
shareholders expressed a concern that financing such a
buyback was a costly maneuver and thus was not a measure to build shareholder value. 4g
F. Pennsylvania'sConstituency Statutes are Tested by the
Court
The fate of AlliedSignal's takeover bid was ultimately
left to the courts where Pennsylvania's constituency statute
was put to the test. In AMP, Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc.,"0
AMP sought partial summary judgment in the nature of a
declaratory judgment that AlliedSignal's consent solicitation to expand the size of AMP's board was unlawful and
requested that AlliedSignal be enjoined from carrying out
its consent solicitation until AMP had the "opportunity to
consider its various constituencies and to act in what it believes to be the best interest of the corporation." 5' AMP alleged that AlliedSignal's tender offer and consent solicitation materials were false and misleading because
AlliedSignal failed to disclose that its board nominees, all of
whom were currently serving as officers or directors of
AlliedSignal, have a duty to AlliedSignal, and thus would
have a conflict of interest since they could not independently exercise their fiduciary duties to AMP." AlliedSignal
sought immediate declaratory judgment that 1) AMP's
amendments to its poison pill, making it nonredeemable
upon a change in the control of AMP's board, and 2) AMP's
amendment to its poison pill, making it nonredeemable if
AMP shareholders voted to place control of the poison pill in
the hands of persons other than the existing board of directors, were illegal and requested that AMP be enjoined from

148. See Gordon Fairclough, AMP, In Move to Thrwart AlliedSignal, Offers
to Buy Some Shares, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1998, at A4.
149. See id.
150. No. CIV.A.98-4405, CIV.A.98-4058, CIV.A.98-4109, 1998 WL 778348
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998).
151. Id. at *3.
152. See Block & Rice, supra note 122, at 166-67.
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enforcing these provisions."' Shareholders also participated
in the suit... and requested that the court order AMP to disclose, pursuant to PBCL section 1715, "all material facts
considered by the AMP board in weighing the potential
value of AMP stock against the offer by AlliedSignal to purchase AMP common stock at $44.50 per share."' 5 In effect,
shareholders were questioning whether AMP directors
acted in accordance with their fiduciary standard as set
forth in PBCL section 1712.
The court held that AlliedSignal's consent solicitation to
have shareholders amend AMP by-laws to remove from the
AMP board all power with respect to the poison pill and to
place this authority in the hands of a three person committee violated PBCL section 2513 because only the board is
authorized to take action in the context of an unsolicited
takeover attempt. The action of AMP's board to amend its
poison pill was
presumed to be in the best interest of the
57
corporation.
The court also denied AlliedSignal's request for declaratory judgment to invalidate AMP's poison pill amendments
which provided that its poison pill would become nonredeemable. Under PBCL section 1712, the court held that
AMP directors have a fiduciary duty that does not require
them not to redeem a poison pill, and that under PBCL section 1715, the "AMP board is not required to act solely because of the consideration that might be paid to shareholders in the event of an acquisition."'
AMP's amendments to its poison pill were also upheld
under section 1715(a)(3) of the PBCL which authorizes a
board to consider the intent and past, stated, or potential
conduct of any person seeking control of the corporation.'59
In this regard, the court held that AMP properly considered
the intent and conduct of AlliedSignal and modified its poi-

153. See generally id. This is a request to enjoin AMP from taking steps to
frustrate the ability of AMP shareholders to determine whether or not to accept
AlliedSignal's tender off and to prevent AMP from interfering with AlliedSignal's tender offer and consent solicitation. See AMP, Inc., 1998 WL 778348,
at *3.
154. See AMP, Inc., 1998 WL 778348, at *4.
155. Id. at *4.
156. See id. at *5.
157. See id.
158. Id. at *6.
159. See id.
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son pill in good faith. 6 °
The facts that enabled the court to make this determination were that AMP considered AlliedSignal's merger bid
to be contrary to its best interests, that AMP found its own
restructuring plan to be superior than AlliedSignal's future
plans for AMP, that the nonredemption feature of the poison pill was finite in time, and AlliedSignal's stated purpose
of acquiring control over the board was to remove the poison pill.'
AMP's motion to enjoin the consent solicitation to increase the size of AMP's board was also granted. The court
reasoned that section 1712(a) of the PBCL required that directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation they
serve. "[If AlliedSignal's nominees were elected to the AMP
board, their fiduciary duty would have to be to AMP [and]
not to [AlliedSignal] shareholders [or] to AlliedSignal."'
Thus the court enjoined AlliedSignal from increasing the
size of AMP's board until its nominees stated unequivocally
that they had a fiduciary duty "solely to AMP under Pennsylvania Law" and until each nominee included a statement
"affirmatively committing personally to that duty."'63
Finally, in regard to the shareholder litigation requesting AMP to disclose all facts considered in weighing
AlliedSignal's $44.50 price, the court held that section 1717
states that directors owe a fiduciary duty solely to the corporation, and that "shareholders do not have standing to
bring a direct
cause of action for an alleged breach of fiduci164
ary duty."
G. The FinalOutcome
On November 12, 1998, an "influential member" of
AMP's board suggested that if AlliedSignal was able to solicit consent for support of its 17 board nominees, AMP
could put itself up for sale to ensure that the higher possible price could be obtained. 65 On November 13, 1998, AMP
announced that it was dropping its lobbying efforts to pass
"The AMP Law," and stated that it would, instead, focus on
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at *6, *8.
See id. at *6*8.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *12.
Id.
See Board:AMP CouldSell, YORK DAILY REC., Nov. 12, 1998, at D1.
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its restructuring plan in the belief that "increasing shareholder value is the best way to fend off a hostile takeover."'66
On November 17, 1998, a federal judge indicated that he
would lift an injunction placed on AlliedSignal's consent solicitation to increase AMP's board. 67 On November 23,
1998, Tyco and AMP announced that Tyco had agreed to
acquire AMP "for at least $51 a share in stock, or $11.3 bil' Robert Ripp stated that Tyco offered AMP sharelion.""68
holders "a very wholesome price" and that since it would be
a stock swap, it would allow shareholders "to participate in
the upside" as AMP's restructuring plan begins to show results. 69
IV. PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUENCY STATUTES: A SWORD AND
A SHIELD

When AMP rejected AlliedSignal's tender offer, Robert
Ripp was confident in AMP's restructuring plan, which was
designed to boost revenue and eliminate costs, and pleaded
to AMP shareholders that "[w]e need time" to do what it
takes to grow the company and "achieve the results our
shareholders expect."7 ° AMP was so confident in its restructuring plan and its ability to meet its goals that AMP's
board planned to let the poison pill expire in November of
1999 and promised not replace it for at least six months after that time, giving shareholders an opportunity to take
action then. 7 ' This gave AMP the appearance of looking for
166. Mario Cattabiani, ProposedAnti-Takeover Law Affecting PNC, Mellon,
AMP Dealt Major Blow, PITT. Bus. TIMES AND J., Nov. 13, 1998, at 26. At this
point in time, the House had passed the bill but with numerous amendments,
and the Governor expressed his support for the AMP measure. See id.
167. See Judge Says AlliedSignal Complies With Court Order, Electronic
http'//www.ebnews.com/story/
1998,
21,
Dec.
News,
Bulletin
OEG19981117S0029 (on file with the author and the Buffalo Law Review).
168. Steven Lipin & Gordon Fairelough, Tyco Reaches Agreement to Buy
AMP in Stock Swap Valued at $11.3 Billion,WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at A3.
169. Id. at A8.
170. Gordon Fairclough, AMP Appoints Ripp as Chairman,CEO, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 24, 1998, at A3.
171. See id. at A6. Discussing the fact that AMP will allow its poison pill to
expire in November, 1999, Mr. Ripp stated that "ifwe don't get where we say
we're going to get, I'll let nature take its course." Gordon Fairclough, AMP Chief
PromisesEconomic Incentive to get Stockholders to Reject Takeover, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 11, 1998, at A4. AMP and its advisers stated that they only want a chance
to achieve the promised results of their restructuring plan. See Lipin & Fairclough, supranote 144, at A3.
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at least one more year to generate growth while simultaneously, because the poison pill would not be renewed for at
least six months after November 1999, creating the appearance of future AMP susceptibility to tender offers."2 Of
course, the constituency statute was invoked to enable AMP
to take on this appearance, and the courts upheld AMP's
poison pill amendments citing to PBCL section 1715 provisions that authorize a board to consider the long-term interests of the corporation and the intent and conduct of
AlliedSignal in seeking to acquire AMP.
AMP consistently argued that AlliedSignal's $44.50 per
share price was inadequate, that AMP's own "on-going
profit improvement plan [would] offer more value in the
long term" and that preventing the AlliedSignal takeover
attempt would save thousands of in-state jobs." Consideration of the long term interests of the corporation and its
employees are two significant components of Pennsylvania's
constituency statutes. Writing in response to a demand by
AMP's second largest shareholder to open good-faith negotiations with AlliedSignal or any other interested parties,
Robert Ripp replied that "as a board, we have an overarching responsibility to AMP, all of its shareholders and its
other constituencies, which we believe we are serving on a
basis consistent with your interests."74 Again, Ripp invoked
language consistent with the constituency statues. Although Ripp never discussed how he balanced the varying
constituency interests, the statute does not require any balancing to justify a board's decision making.
Under the guise of improving long term value and saving jobs, and under the cover of PBCL section 1715, AMP's
poison pill amendments were upheld by the court. As a result, AMP gained one year of breathing room, for as long as
its poison pill remained nonredeemable in the time period
prior to November, 1999, AMP could shop itself to find a
higher offer, implement its restructuring plan to prove that
it can work, negotiate with AlliedSignal, or let shareholders
decide what to do. Having been vindicated in the courts,
AMP utilized its legal cover and time to find its white172. Presumably at this time, if the restructuring plan failed, allowing for
tender offers without the protection of a poison pill would then be in the best
interest of the corporation.
173. Tom Dochat, AlliedSignal May Drop Its Hostile Bid, HARRISBURG
PATRIOT, Oct. 3, 1998, at Al.
174. Lipin & Gordon, supranote 144, at A3.
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knight in Tyco.
CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania's constituency statue can be nominally
deployed in the name of protecting non-shareholder constituent interests while simultaneously and effectively deployed in the pursuit of maximizing shareholder wealth.
AlliedSignal's hostile takeover attempt was delayed, frustrated, and ultimately defeated by AMP's use of Pennsylvania's constituency statute."5 However, at the same time
Tyco's acquisition of AMP was facilitated by, and AMP
shareholder wealth was also maximized by, this very same
statute.
All of AMP's defensive tactics were deployed under the
language of PBCL section 1715 to protect the best interests
of the corporation including AMP's employees, suppliers,
customers, and the local community. Although, at the same
time, AMP implemented its own restructuring plan, including cutting 4,800 jobs, 7 ' AMP management insisted
that an independent AMP would provide more long-term
value than AlliedSignal's short-term premium or long-term
plan. To the chagrin of AMP shareholders, who demanded
that AMP negotiate with AlliedSignal to maximize a stock
price premium,"' the court upheld all of AMP's tactics to
the full extent of the Pennsylvania constituency statue. Yet,
despite all of AMP's defensive measures and despite the
175. AMP's defense of AlliedSignal's hostile takeover attempt was bolstered
by AMP's use of other Pennsylvania anti-takeover laws, federal courts, lobbyists, AMP employees, the Pennsylvania State Legislature, and public relations
firms; however, all of these tactics were utilized in an attempt to protect the
best interests of AMP, its employees, and its community.
176. See Dinah Wisenberg Brin, Job Issues Thwarted AlliedSignal, But
AMP Loses Them Anyway, Dow JONEs NEWS SERV., May 3, 1999.
177. See Steven Lipin & Gordon Fairclough, Bid by AlliedSignal Finds
Friendin Hixon Family, A founder of the Firm,WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1999, at A3.
In a September 29, 1998, letter to the AMP board, the Hixon family, the second
largest shareholder at 4%, expressed dismay at management's anti-takeover
tactics and entrenchment activity occurring at the expense of shareholders, and
requested the AMP board to take "immediate action to truly maximize shareholder value" by opening negotiations with AlliedSignal and any other interested parties. Id.; see also Gordon Fairclough, AMP's Tactics Against AlliedSignal Bid are Criticized by Big Pension Fund, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at
A17 (reporting that the College Retirement Equities Fund, holder of 1.3 million
of AMP's 218.6 million shares outstanding, accused AMP of trampling shareholder rights).
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constituency statute legislative rhetoric about saving jobs
and facilitating the maintenance of a corporate presence in
Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania's constituency statute proved
178. See COMMONWEALTH OF PA., LEGIS. JOURNAL-SENATE, S. 1144-1597
(1983).
I submit to this Senate that, yes, this bill does help corporate interests
in Pennsylvania, but it helps Pennsylvania in improving the corporate
business climate here so we can keep our jobs here and hopefully even
attract new ones.... I urge all the Members of this Senate to vote in
favor of this bill this time so we can give a very clear message to the
business community, the labor community and to the entire nation that
businesses do, in fact, have a friend in Pennsylvania, and that friend is
its Legislature who can respond to corporate needs when they are in
the best interest of all the citizens of Pennsylvania.
Id. (statement of Senator Fumo). Whether the Pennsylvania constituency statute actually protected AMP employees, suppliers, customers, and the communities in which AMP offices or other establishments are located is a question that
only Tyco can answer now. See Joann S. Lublin and Mark Maremont, A CEO
With a Motto: "Let's Make a Deal,"WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1999, at B1,B14. "AMP
hardly needs 327 buildings or 14 executives' approval for every new product ....We believe there's another $300 million in cost [cuts] readily available
to us ....We are going to make [AMP] a low-cost producer." Id. (quoting Tyco
CEO Dennis Kozlowski). In January, 1999, Tyco announced the closing of over
50 plant and administrative facilities. See Tom Dochat, A New Era ForAMP:
Job Cuts Loom as Tyco Takeover Descends on Apprehensive Workers. SUNDAY
PATRIOT-NEWS HARRISBURG, Mar. 28, 1999, at Al. In April, 1999, Tyco announced that $500 million in cost savings and reductions will be squeezed out of
AMP. See Brett Lieberman, Tyco May Prescribe Drastic Diet for AMP: New
Owner Wants $500 Million More in Cuts, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS HARRISBURG,
Apr. 4, 1999, at Al. In April, 1999, Tyco also announced that 4,000 jobs would
be eliminated in addition to the 4,200 positions AMP committed to cutting prior
to Tyco's acquisition of AMP. See AMP Unit to Cut Jobs, Resulting in Big
Charge, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1999, at A12. Thus, a total of approximately 8400
of AMP's 48,000 employees are to be laid off. See Tyco Plans to Lay Off 24% of
Work force at its Raychem Unit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1999, at Cll. This layoff
includes 2100 of AMP's 8300 Pennsylvania positions. See Brin, supra note 176.
Also in April, 1999, Tyco announced the resignation of former AMP CEO Robert
Ripp, who was to continue on as a subsidiary president of AMP and a Tyco
board member. See Gordon Fairclough, AMP ChairmanRipp to Step Down, As
ShareholdersBack Deal With Tyco, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1999, at B4. With this
resignation, AMP non-shareholder constituents have lost any voice that they
may have had on the Tyco board, assuming, of course, that Ripp would have
looked out for their best interests as he claimed to have done during the failed
AlliedSignal takeover attempt. See supra Part III.A-B. With his resignation,
Ripp "will receive three years' pay, or $3 million," including an additional
$198,804, a sum equal to the highest bonus he received in the previous three
years. David DeKok, What Does It All Mean?, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Apr. 2,
1999, at Al. By the summer of 1999, the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency
had agreed to buy AMP's former headquarters building. See Tom Dochat, Central Pennsylvania Sees Some of its Business Giants Stumble in 1999. PATRIOT
NEWS HARRISBURG, Jan. 2, 2000.
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incapable of maintaining AMP's corporate presence in
Pennsylvania, but, ironically, capable of maximizing the
price of its shares.
The constituency statute proved essential to AMP and
AMP shareholders because its implementation provided
AMP with more time to seek a higher bid for control of the
corporation. Perhaps without the protection of the constituency statue, AMP may have been unable to delay AlliedSignal's takeover efforts and obtain the premium that Tyco
paid to AMP shareholders. In the end, approximately five
months after AlliedSignal offered to buy AMP for $43.50 a
share, AMP found a bidder willing to pay $51.35 per
share.' 9 While a Pennsylvania takeover target can implement the constituency statue in the name of saving jobs,
maintaining communities, and minimizing impacts on vendors and suppliers, the Tyco purchase proved that a Pennsylvania takeover target can also simultaneously deploy the
constituency statute to tacitly, yet effectively, increase
shareholder wealth.

179. Tyco agreed to acquire AMP Inc for $11.3 billion, or approximately
$51.35 per share, topping AlliedSignal's offer of $9.8 billion, or $44.50 a share.
See Gordon Fariclough & Mark Maremont, Accord With AMP Caps Months of
Deal Making by Tyco, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at B4.

